Circularity and Stability :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Circularity and StabilityWilliam Alston argues that there is no way to read that whatsoever of our basic origins of belief is reliable without falling into epistemic circularity, i.e. relying at some point on premises that are themselves derived from the very same source. His appeal to pragmatic rationality is an adjudicate to evaluate our sources of belief without relying on beliefs that are based on the sources under scrutiny and thus without just presupposing their reliability. I argue that this attempt fails and that Ernest Sosas appeal to the coherence theory of justification fails, too, if it is understood as an attempt to find a similar external evaluation of our sources of belief that does not just assume their reliability. I concluded that there is no alternative to taking an innate view to our own reliability and embracing epistemic circularity. why suppose that any of the bases on which we regularly and unquestionably form beliefs are reliable? Why suppose that sens e perception, in particular, is a reliable source of information of the physical environment? These are questions that William Alston raises in his recent books Perceiving God (1991) and The Reliability of Sense Perception (1993). He argues that there is no way to show that any of our basic sources of belief is reliable without falling into epistemic circularity. There is no way to show that such a source is reliable without relying at some point or another on premises that are themselves derived from that source. So we cannot have any non-circular reasons for supposing that the sources on which we base our beliefs are reliable.Alston thinks, however, that there is a way of evaluating the reliability of our sources of belief that is independent of the beliefs based on those sources and that does not therefore fall into circularity. I will argue that Alstons attempt to find such an external support for our sources of beliefs fails. I will also consider Ernest Sosas (1994, 1995) most recent attempt to deal with the problem and argue that if it is understood as a related attempt to find an external standpoint from which to evaluate our sources of belief, it fails, too. I will conclude that there is no alternative to a purely internal approach in which we evaluate our sources of beliefs in terms of the beliefs that derive from the very same sources and thus to embracing epistemic circularity.